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Ethical norms and the international governance of genetic
databases and biobanks: findings from an international study
Abstract
This article highlights major results of a study into the ethical norms and rules governing biobanks.
After describing the methodology, the findings regarding four topics are presented: (1) the ownership of
human biological samples held in biobanks; (2) the regulation of researchers' use of samples obtained
from biobanks; (3) what constitutes “collective consent” to genetic research, and when it is needed; and
(4) benefit sharing and remuneration of research participants. The paper then summarizes key lessons to
be drawn from the findings and concludes by reflecting on the importance of such empirical research to
inform future governance norms and practices.
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ABSTRACT. This article highlights major results of a study into the ethical norms 
and rules governing biobanks. After describing the methodology, the findings re-
garding four topics are presented: (1) the ownership of human biological samples 
held in biobanks; (2) the regulation of researchers’ use of samples obtained from 
biobanks; (3) what constitutes “collective consent” to genetic research, and when 
it is needed; and (4) benefit sharing and remuneration of research participants. 
The paper then summarizes key lessons to be drawn from the findings and con-
cludes by reflecting on the importance of such empirical research to inform future 
governance norms and practices.
Despite the rapid proliferation of genetic and genomic databases around the world, and the associated burgeoning of national and international guidance documents suggesting various ways 
for governing them, consensus over the most appropriate ethical norms 
and legal rules is still a very long way off. Partly, this is due to a lack of 
empirical data—especially data that capture in detail the views of experts 
engaged in the biobanking field on specific ethical concerns. A number 
of studies have been carried out to evaluate the views of patients and the 
public (Hoeyer et al. 2004; Pentz, Billot, and Wendler 2006). The views 
of experts have not been sufficiently evaluated, however, even though as 
members of ethics committees and advisors to research consortia they 
play an important role in shaping future practice.
This article discusses an international study into the ethical norms 
potentially applicable to genetic databases and biobanks. This multi-year 
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(January 2004–June 2006), collaborative project involved several Swiss 
academic institutions and the Department of Ethics, Trade, Human Rights 
and Health Law of the World Health Organization (WHO), of which the 
first author was the director at the time when the project was established.1 
The study’s several components include a comparative analysis of existing 
(and sometimes conflicting) ethical guidance documents produced by a 
number of organizations, as well as of relevant laws and regulations. The 
documents on which we drew were created by such organizations as the 
Human Genome Organization (HUGO) (HUGO Ethics Committee 1996; 
2000; 2002), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) (UNESCO 1997; 2003; 2005), the Council of 
Europe (1994; 1997; 2006), and the National Bioethics Advisory Com-
mission (NBAC) appointed by President Clinton (NBAC 1999). Our study 
focused on documents, primarily at the international level, that set forth 
ethical standards for the operation of genetic databases and biobanks or 
that address such institutions indirectly, such as through general guidelines 
on research with human subjects that encompass research utilizing stored 
human biological material. A comparison of these documents revealed 
certain common assumptions, numerous points of difference, and several 
lacunae regarding practical issues that are not fully addressed. From this 
exercise, we developed a set of issues that seemed likely to be salient and 
significant for experts concerned with biobanking around the world; as 
discussed later in the methodology section, these issues then provided the 
framework for our interview questionnaire.
In this article, we concentrate not on our analysis of the normative 
guidelines themselves (Knoppers and Abdul-Rahman 2008), but rather 
on the responses obtained from our interviews with international experts 
who were people knowledgeable about biobanks either because they 
operate, or conduct research utilizing, a biobank or because they develop 
policies or prepare ethical guidelines for biobanking. The paper discusses 
the study’s methods, main results, and policy insights generated by this 
component of the study. We focus on the results of interviews that we 
conducted with 42 experts internationally. We also refer to the results of 
a second study involving a similar group of 45 respondents in the United 
States (U.S.). Following a brief description of the study’s methodology, 
we outline our findings and analysis regarding four specific topics that 
present particular challenges for the international governance of genetic 
databases and genomic research: (1) the ownership of human biological 
samples held in biobanking repositories; (2) the methods that may be used 
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to regulate researchers’ use of samples obtained from biobanks; (3) what 
constitutes “collective consent” to genetic research, and when it is needed; 
and (4) benefit sharing and remuneration of research participants. Policy 
insights pertaining to these four areas are then presented. In particular, 
we highlight that property rights in, and use of, samples ought to be 
governed by rules and agreements that would limit researchers’ actions 
to the scope of the informed consent provided when samples and data 
are collected for a biobank. Furthermore, although collective consent is 
meaningful only under exceptional circumstances, group consultations 
may be advisable for practical purposes. Finally, monetary remuneration 
of individual donors usually is not acceptable, but benefits ought to be 
shared with the population from which the samples came, particularly 
when research involves vulnerable populations or individuals who are at 
risk of exploitation in the context of biobank research.
In what follows, the terms “biobank” and “genetic database” are used 
interchangeably to signify a collection of human biological samples that 
can be used for genetic analysis. These encompass pathology collections, 
repositories for specific diseases—e.g., cancer registries—and population 
databases created to permit longitudinal studies of multiple diseases or 
conditions. The term “biobank” seems to be used most commonly to 
signify a database that combines biological samples with the results of 
genetic analyses along with health or other data about the persons from 
whom the samples were collected (such as workplace and residential 
information).
SAMPLE DESCRIPTION
The 42 respondents in our international cohort were experts who 
worked with genetic databases or who were engaged at the level of policy 
making, drawn from a range of professional disciplines and institutions. 
The respondents were chosen on a “purposive sampling” basis—that is, 
they were invited because of their professional backgrounds and to achieve 
a varied geographical distribution, rather than being a random sample. 
Individuals were identified through their contributions to scientific and 
policy debates; subsequently, the circle of invitees was enlarged through 
snowball sampling. Ninety invitation letters were sent, and 42 experts 
agreed to participate.
The respondents’ mean age was 51 years; the range was from 29 
years to 77 years. Their primary affiliations (including several with two 
major affiliations) were as follows: 23 were employed at a university or 
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university hospital; 8 worked for a government agency; 3 were with non-
governmental organizations; 4 were directly associated with biobanks or 
genetic databanks (one of which was located in the private sector); 4 were 
independent consultants; 3 were members of national ethics committees; 
and 1 worked at an international organization. The respondents came 
from 27 countries, from all parts of world. The Human Development 
Index2 of these countries encompassed 18 High, 6 Medium, and 3 Low 
ranked countries. A range of expertise is represented among the respon-
dents, with some being expert in more than one field: 17 work in the life 
sciences, including genetics; 18 are physicians; 7 are in bioethics and 4 in 
philosophy; 5 are lawyers; and 5 come from other fields such as social sci-
ence and engineering. We also asked respondents about the nature of the 
work that they do regarding genetic databases. Twenty-nine are involved 
in analyzing the ethical or legal issues in biobanking; 16 are engaged in 
making recommendations or drafting guidelines; and 18 handle or use 
samples or genetic data in their work.
METHODOLOGY FOR GATHERING THE DATA
We sought the respondents’ views about the alternative policy op-
tions posed in four hypothetical factual scenarios presented to them. The 
scenarios were constructed around the leading ethical and legal issues to 
have emerged in the international literature and ethical guidance docu-
ments on biobanks to date, as well as the views of a number of geneticists, 
bioethicists, and other experts whom we consulted. The scenarios were 
distributed in advance to each respondent, who was then interviewed—
in most cases by telephone—by a member of the research team using an 
interview guide (see example in the appendix). The interviews combined 
open-ended questions and a semi-directive style with a few structured 
questions; in particular, respondents were prompted to explain the basis 
on which they reached conclusions. The instrument was tested through 
six pilot interviews; the actual interviews lasted 33 to 75 minutes, with a 
mean duration of 50 minutes. A majority were held in English, but, when 
respondents preferred, interviews were conducted in Spanish, French, and 
Italian. All interviews were taped, transcribed, and analyzed. In this article, 
we provide a brief overview of the topics that come across as key issues 
in the ongoing debate; the results of the qualitative analysis are presented 
in greater detail in a monograph (Elger et al. 2008).
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FOCUSING RESPONSES THROUGH SCENARIOS
Because we were suspicious that “opinion polls” draw formulaic re-
sponses and do not permit one to get beneath the surface generalities of 
the existing guidelines for biobanking, we developed four hypothetical 
factual scenarios—several with multiple parts—to force respondents to 
consider the ethical and legal issues in the context of “real choices.” For 
example, Scenario A introduced a series of questions by setting up the 
following situation:
 An international group of researchers has decided to establish and 
operate a repository in which DNA extracted from biological specimens will 
be stored along with related information. The purpose of the repository is 
to enable research on the association of certain genes with an elevated risk 
for developing colorectal polyps.
 The research is funded by the health departments of three different 
countries, one of which acts as the home for the repository. The project is 
guided by a Steering Committee consisting of the principal investigator from 
each of the three countries, a representative of the international association 
for colon cancer patients, and a member of the Medical Research Council 
of the home country. An independent Ethics Review Board provides ethical 
guidance.
 Local physicians will collect 3,000 biological samples from individu-
als diagnosed with colorectal polyps and from their blood relatives. The 
physicians will also fill out a health and lifestyle information sheet about 
every participant and send it along with the sample to the repository. This 
information will be periodically updated and any deaths will be reported. 
Informed consent will be obtained from all participants for their biologi-
cal samples and associated information to be submitted to the repository. 
Biological samples will be stored at the repository in the form of extracted 
DNA.
 A number of policies to guide the operations of the repository are now 
being discussed.
The scenario then developed a number of questions for the respondents 
by describing various policies being considered by the Ethics Review Board 
and the Steering Committee. Respondents were asked not just which policy 
option they favored but also why they favored it. This specific scenario 
laid out options concerning seven key policy areas that implicate impor-
tant ethical and legal issues and principles: (1) a fairly elaborate system of 
double-coding—as a means of protecting participants’ privacy by prevent-
ing individual identification; (2) the extent to which participants should be 
kennedy institute oF ethiCs journal • june 2009
[  106  ]
able to withdraw samples and associated information from the repository; 
(3) the use of samples for biomedical research not involving colon cancer; 
(4) giving notification to a participant’s physician when a gene mutation 
believed to be linked to an elevated risk of colon cancer is discovered; (5) 
the obligations imposed on researchers who receive samples not to transfer 
these samples to persons not named in the Material Transfer Agreement 
(MTA)3 and to share their research findings with the repository; (6) the 
closing of the repository and destruction of the samples at the end of the 
study; and (7) ownership of the samples and data.
To illustrate how these issues were framed, the following is the wording 
of the subpart of this scenario that probes the last set of issues regarding 
ownership:
A member of the Steering Committee has proposed the following policy:
1.  Ownership of samples. The repository is the custodian of the samples 
and associated information on behalf of the participants.
2.  Ownership of the data. The data generated by the research will be treated 
as a public good and all investigators must agree to put their findings 
and supporting data in the public domain on a regular basis and without 
undue delay.4
The interviewer then asked whether it was preferable for the repository 
to be the custodian, as proposed, or alternatively the owner of the samples 
once they have been submitted.
DATA ANALYSIS
We carried out a modified thematic analysis of the transcribed inter-
views: A researcher read through the transcribed data to identify the 
concepts and reasons on which respondents based their viewpoints. (The 
accuracy of the transcription and the characterization of the response 
was double-checked and confirmed or corrected by another member of 
the team reviewing the same transcripts and checking the original tapes 
when necessary.) The most relevant transcribed text concerning each 
reason or concept was extracted; these excerpts were collated on data 
sheets with similar reasons given by other participants. Conceptually as-
sociated reasons described by the respondents were grouped together and 
labeled with “codes.” Among the various types of arguments mentioned 
by respondents, we also identified and grouped together those that were 
based on similar ethical reasoning, such as consequentialist versus deon-
tological arguments, as well as references to different ethical principles. 
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In this article, we provide in addition simple counts of respondents in 
favor or against a particular policy, following accepted methodology for 
providing readers with a useful summary of some aspects of the analysis 
(Pope, Ziebland, and Mays 2000).
FOUR KEY TOPICS OF INTEREST FOR THE  
GOVERNANCE OF GENETIC DATABASES
Repository Ownership vs. Custodianship of Biological Materials
Different schools of thought within property law theory vary in how 
they explain the nature of property rights, how they define the concept 
of “ownership,” and how they specify the objects that property rights 
may legitimately encompass. No single, universally accepted theoretical 
account exists (Becker 1977; Harris 1996; Penner 1997; Waldron 1988). 
However, many property law theorists employ the term “ownership” 
to describe a person’s control over a “thing”—that is, the ability to use, 
transfer, and enjoy exclusive possession of the thing, as well as to manage 
its use by others and to collect rents for such use. We began knowing that 
“ownership” is a controversial topic, but it was interesting to find what 
a confusing concept it is for many of our respondents, especially those 
who do not have a great deal to do with the law. Guidance documents 
that proclaim general principles about who “owns” samples and data 
thus not only may fail to take account of people’s sense that these matters 
need to be resolved differently in different contexts, but also may disguise 
the extent to which people use the term “ownership” in very different—
indeed, contradictory—ways.
Almost all responses from the international respondents to this part of 
Scenario A characterized the biobank as the custodian, rather than the 
owner, of the deposited material. Among those who explained this con-
clusion, most phrased their answer in terms of the participants being the 
owners of the samples deposited. As one respondent put it, “I own my 
genes, not the custodian. . . . And if I give the genes [in form of a sample] 
to a custodian to look after, it doesn’t mean that [the custodian] owns 
them. I still own them, but I’ve given them in custody.” By implication, 
there is no transfer of ownership simply because a sample was held in the 
biobank. A few respondents suggested that genetic resources are inher-
ently collective in nature and hence are “owned” by the group of which 
the participant is a member, while others went still further and regarded 
the biobank as a custodian even though neither participants nor groups 
own the samples.
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A small number of respondents considered the biobank the owner of 
the samples. The reasons given for this position included that it favors 
transparency or is simply best as a practical matter. Interestingly, two 
respondents who characterized a genetic database as an organized system 
that entails more than merely collecting and storing samples and infor-
mation—“not only biological material but also an organized system”—
concluded that this meant the biobank should be regarded as the owner 
of the samples it holds because the samples are part of the system as a 
whole, which is the creation, and hence the property, of the biobank. 
Several respondents insisted that ownership is not the right concept to 
use for such samples—“ownership is very tricky but custodianship and 
stewardship help to take care of your right to hold the material.” Finally, 
one respondent said that deciding between custodianship and ownership 
depended on the particular circumstances.
Disparate Reasons for a Common Conclusion on Custodianship
The responses to this scenario show that many experts favored the idea 
of custodianship but that they based this preference on two quite differ-
ent sets of belief about ownership of stored samples. (The same reasoning 
appeared among the respondents in the U.S. interviews.) Some expressed 
general dissatisfaction with the idea of anyone “owning” human samples. 
They described ownership as being “too strong” and “too theoretical.” 
Further, they associated the concept of ownership with the “irreversibility” 
of the transfer, an issue that we had introduced earlier in the scenario, as 
noted previously. Others among those who regarded the repository as a 
custodian had no problem with the idea of people owning samples. Indeed, 
these respondents commonly said that a person who had contributed a 
sample still “owns” it even when it is stored in a biobank.
Two categories of respondents especially favored treating the repository 
as a custodian. The first such group comprised the organizers of biobanks 
(not principal investigators or comparable people on research projects 
who use biobanks in genetic and epidemiological studies). This group of 
respondents saw themselves as “mediators” between research participants 
and investigators, and they thought that the concept of custodianship 
helped them to exercise control. The second group who favored the cus-
todianship model consisted of respondents from indigenous populations, 
who favored the idea of “collective ownership” residing in the group from 
which participants came. These respondents took a broader view of the 
biological material (DNA) as being part of the genealogy of the partici-
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pants or as “containing [the participants’] spirit.” (We return to the topic 
of collective action below.)
Biobanks as Owners of Biological Samples
A substantial minority of our international respondents thought that a 
repository owns the material deposited with it. (This view was held even 
more widely in our U.S. sample.) They adopted this position largely for 
practical reasons. First, it would help prevent abuses because a biobank 
is in a better position to protect and manage a collection of materials and 
data that belongs to it. Second, they worried that treating the repository as 
a mere custodian would give participants the (false) impression that they 
could come and take their samples out of the biobank freely and at will 
at any time. These respondents pointed out that participants must be told 
that they are surrendering ownership when they donate their samples.
Data as a Public Good
As set forth in Scenario A above, the “proposal” of the Steering Com-
mittee member presented a second issue, having to do with the policy on 
ownership of data generated by research projects undertaken using the 
repository materials. The proposal was that the data would be treated as 
“a public good” and that researchers would have to agree to put their 
findings and data into the public domain regularly and without delay. A 
majority of the respondents favored this requirement, even though, in the 
literature around biobanking, the practical implications of this view are 
regarded as controversial (Eisenberg 2000; Chokshi, Parker, and Kwiat-
kowski 2006).
Researchers’ Obligations
Immediately prior to the questions regarding ownership, Scenario A 
presented some questions about the obligations of researchers who were 
given access to samples from the repository:
The Steering Committee proposes to include the following provisions in 
the Material Transfer Agreement (i.e., the contract setting the terms for 
giving an investigator access to biological specimens and the associated 
information):
1.  Investigators must not transfer the DNA and the associated information 
to persons not named in the Material Transfer Agreement.
2.  Investigators are under the obligation to share all research findings and 
the data produced for each sample with the repository.
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Duties of Nonmaleficence and Fidelity
Respondents, including those in the U.S. sample, substantially agreed 
about investigators’ obligations to adhere to the restrictions in the MTA. 
Their reasoning reflected the values of nonmaleficence and fidelity. Respon-
dents said that such restrictions would prevent abuses (material “falling 
into wrong hands”), would protect participants’ autonomy (against sec-
ondary uses not authorized in the original informed consent document), 
and would honor participants’ trust in the repository. Specifically, they 
commented that:
[T]here is an incredible amount of secondary uses that are not authorized 
particularly in the informed consent.
[Researchers] have the responsibility that the tissue is used according to 
agreement between the bank and the donor.
On the other hand, a small number of respondents disagreed with the 
proposed policy because it is often difficult to establish at the outset what 
all future collaborations will be, or because a narrowly drafted MTA can 
burden researchers excessively.
The Flip Side: Biobanks’ Obligations
The chief concern expressed, however, arose from the recognition that 
placing restrictions on researchers carries with it the implication that 
biobanks are obligated to enforce rules about the use of samples by inves-
tigators who obtain access to them from the biobank. Such an obligation 
may prove to be complex once the samples have been placed in the hands 
of the initial investigator. As one interviewee stated:
We call it “policing tissue.” Because the tissue bank is custodian of the tissue 
and it received the permission from the donor and the next-to-kin to use 
the tissue, the tissue bank is also the [one] who is responsible and has the 
knowledge of who is using the tissue. . . . I have heard about several cases 
of tissue banks that gave tissue for research and the tissue ended up in the 
pharmaceutical company being used for something completely different.  
. . . We have the responsibility that the tissue is used according to agreement 
between the bank and the donor.
The respondents also were asked whether contractual limitations are 
enforceable and thus practical as a means for ensuring and monitoring 
compliance and to safeguard against misconduct or abuse. There was sub-
stantial agreement among interviewees, in both the international and the 
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U.S. samples, that contractual limitations are enforceable. Indeed, “that’s 
taken for granted,” as one respondent stated. The strategies for ensuring 
compliance suggested by respondents included: (1) giving investigators 
the minimum amounts of samples and information needed; (2) requir-
ing investigators to return all unused material to the biobank; and (3) 
requiring authors to state in their publications the origins of the samples 
and raw data used. In addition to having explicit contracts, respondents 
reported that peer pressure also helps with enforcement of the limitations 
and requirements set down in MTAs.
Individual vs. Collective Consent
Genetic research raises the issue of “collective” or group consent for 
two reasons. First, some genomic research is carried out within isolated 
populations, which generally do not embrace Western, individualistic 
views. When that is the case, even matters not involving group identity 
may be decided through consent by group leaders rather than by the 
person(s) directly concerned.
Second, research findings may impose harms or burdens on a particular 
group. Examples of groups at risk include the relatives of a participant who 
provides a sample and data, the ethnic group of which a participant is a 
member, and other persons who share the same phenotype.5 The interviews 
showed that a special issue arises when the “group” is, in effect, created 
by the research—that is, when the identification of a genetic susceptibil-
ity defines a group of people whose commonality lies in facing the same 
elevated risk of disease. In this circumstance, the utility of taking the group 
into account may reside less in any notion of group permission, and more 
in ensuring that researchers take into account the potential impact of the 
research on the research subjects. Such sensitivity, leading to what was 
seen, in the words of some respondents, as a “constructive relationship,” 
was thought more likely to emerge from group consultation that from 
individual informed consent procedures.
Probing Varied Views about Appropriate Means
Commentators are divided over how to protect groups and their mem-
bers adequately. Some advocate relying on collective consent (Greely 1997; 
North American Regional Committee of the Human Genome Diversity 
Project 1997), while others favor collective permission or approval as well 
as consent by those directly involved (Diallo et al. 2005; Reilly 1998). Still 
others argue that all that is needed is a formal process of group, community, 
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or population consultation—without actual consent or approval—or sim-
ply some form of group involvement—ranging from minimal consultation 
or dissemination of information to an ongoing, formal partnership (Brugge 
and Missaghian 2006; Foster, Eisenbraun, and Carter 1997; Foster et al. 
1999; Sharp and Foster 2000).
These varied views seem to reflect a lack of clarity over the interests 
that are actually at stake and the objectives that should be served. Is what-
ever method is recommended for obtaining collective consent intended 
as a means of protecting individuals—for example, due to their weak 
bargaining position, difficulties comprehending research, and so forth? 
Or is it meant to provide formal recognition of the group—for example, 
by showing deference to its leaders? Alternatively, is a group mechanism 
invoked because the individual is not seen as the correct unit of decision 
making (because the family, village, tribe, or other such group makes com-
parable decisions)? Or is it because the group has interests independent 
of individuals’ interests—and, hence, it must be consulted separately and 
give (or withhold) its consent or permission?
We attempted to tease out some of these differences in Scenario C:
Biotech Incorporated proposes to collect 2,000 biological samples from the 
members of an indigenous population in the country where Biotech Incor-
porated is based. Pharma A, a publicly traded pharmaceutical company, 
finances Biotech Incorporated’s project because it is interested in developing 
a genetic test to detect polymorphisms that are linked to adverse reactions 
to its most frequently prescribed drugs. These polymorphisms are known 
to occur more frequently, though not exclusively, in the studied population. 
Biotech Incorporated will be the owner of all intellectual property rights 
arising out of its research.
Scenario C.1
In its negotiations with the indigenous group, which is represented by a 
Governing Council, Biotech Incorporated has acknowledged its obligation 
to share the benefits of its research with the group. Biotech Incorporated is 
proposing various forms of benefit sharing to the Governing Council:
 Option A: Making any genetic tests resulting from the research avail-
able for free to the indigenous group for ten years.
 Option B: Making an annual donation for a period of ten years to 
the hospital that provides health care to the indigenous group, of a sum 
equivalent to 3% of the revenues generated by any intellectual property 
rights resulting from the research.
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 Option C: Donating several pieces of durable medical equipment to 
the hospital that provides health care to the indigenous group.
The Governing Council determines that none of the proposed forms of 
benefit sharing is adequate, and that an agreement can only be reached if 
the Governing Council owns all intellectual property rights arising out of 
the research (Option D).
Scenario C.2
The negotiations become difficult and eventually stop. An employee from 
Biotech Incorporated, who is a member of the indigenous group, believes 
that the Governing Council is behaving arbitrarily and is out of touch with 
the beliefs of the group. She suggests to the head of the company that she 
could approach individual members of the group and offer them a sum of 
US$800 (roughly equal to four weeks of the average salary for members 
of the group), in exchange for their participation in the research. The offer 
would be contingent on the participants renouncing all intellectual property 
claims.
Practical Aspects
In general, respondents approached the issue as an ethical matter rather 
than simply a practical one. Plainly, however, the scenario does present 
practical concerns, such as the researchers probably needing the consent 
of group leaders to gain access to a setting where they could speak with 
potential individual participants. We were told in some interviews that 
the scenarios therefore raised what one person called a “sneaky” choice. 
Going against the Governing Council would be disruptive and possibly 
create antagonisms among group members. In addition, as one respondent 
stated, “we don’t want to impose values that are foreign to a society,” 
namely, substituting individual self-choice for the authority that resides 
with traditional group leaders.
Respondents who were familiar with the practice of collective consent 
generally were more agreeable to it; these respondents came largely from 
countries outside the U.S. and Europe and particularly from developing 
countries. The major qualification raised by these respondents was to avoid 
concentrating excessive power in the hands of community “representa-
tives” who lack legitimacy. Few respondents from anywhere said that 
collective consent “is never required.” Those familiar with the practice 
observed that obtaining it was common in many remote areas, some-
kennedy institute oF ethiCs journal • june 2009
[  114  ]
times even a legal requirement. Some who regarded individual consent 
as inappropriate when it is not part of the local norms said that once the 
researchers have consulted the group, they must honor the choice made 
by the group.
Respondents were not eager to impose the requirement of consulting 
with every possible member or representative of any given group, as this 
would stifle research. They focused on the central characteristics of situa-
tions where some form of collective agreement would be required. These 
they identified as being: (1) where traditional systems of decision making 
involve collective consent; (2) where research results can affect the whole 
group—e.g., where the group is identifiable or faces potential discrimina-
tion; and (3) where special vulnerability exists, such as the risk of economic 
harm, or the burden of new knowledge on group members’ lives.
Purposes Served by Group Consent or Permission
Significantly, formal “consent” was not assumed by many to be what 
was required. Rather, respondents first expected that group consultation 
would occur to ensure cultural sensitivity in the design and execution of 
the research. Second, respondents from places where group consent or 
permission is the norm regarded it as necessary to maintain group iden-
tity (expressed through the exercise of “group autonomy”). Third, they 
viewed it as the best means of protecting individuals: “Individuals are very 
vulnerable in themselves, unlike the West where historically the individual 
has been protected by constitutions, awareness, and culture.”
In the settings under consideration, the populations are viewed as vulner-
able because, for example, of poverty and a lack of education. It seemed 
to be assumed that group leaders would be more sophisticated and better 
able to act in a free and self-interested fashion than individuals.
Ethical Aspects
The concern expressed by respondents—those who favored collective 
consent as well as those who opposed it—was that group consent ought 
not to be allowed to replace individual consent. As one respondent noted, 
“It is appropriate to have collective permission, some kind of political 
permission for instance; it is important to have public deliberation but 
it doesn’t replace and can never replace individual consent.” Some re-
spondents recognized that this is difficult to enforce in practice because 
individual refusals by members of the group may not be realistic once the 
group leaders have given their approval.
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Respondents also mentioned the need for clarity on the source of moral 
authority of the “Governing Council” in the scenario—for example, is 
it chosen democratically, how representative is it, and will it ensure that 
any benefits reaped in the group’s name are actually shared? In the words 
of a respondent familiar with the practice of collective consent: “There 
are governing councils in developing countries who have misrepresented, 
abused and exploited their own people for a long time.” Some also men-
tioned the need to recognize group conflicts as well as affiliations. A final 
question asked was who would ensure that these criteria are met, and 
how. Is this, such respondents asked, a reasonable obligation to place on 
researchers?
Benefit Sharing and Remuneration
The design of Scenario C also permitted us to explore respondents’ views 
on various types of benefit sharing arrangements. The options set forth 
in the scenario were shaped by combinations of three variables: (1) how 
closely was the benefit related to the study; (2) to whom did the benefit 
flow; and (3) was the benefit fixed or contingent? Although respondents 
generally were favorable to establishing some sort of benefit-sharing 
scheme, they manifested a striking lack of consensus not only in choosing 
the best option but also regarding the principles and arguments support-
ing those choices. Overall, the interviews revealed a preference toward 
group-based benefit sharing, that is “collective benefits” in light of the 
“collective” nature of the study, but many respondents were inclined to 
leave the choice of the best option to the community in question, especially 
“as an outsider,” in the words of one respondent.
Challenges in Deciding What Is Owed to  
Participants and Communities
The difficulty in establishing a benefit-sharing scheme emerges from an 
examination of respondents’ reasons for favoring or rejecting particular 
options. Some found it “inefficient” to try to tie the type or amount of 
benefits closely to the actual research:
The general view is that people make a mistake in trying to link the benefits 
to a particular thing such as the nature of the study; it might be terribly 
inefficient to do so, it might be that the people could use the money [for] 
other things that would be of greater use . . . than just the genetic tests and 
that might be better for everybody.
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For respondents who favored free provision of the genetic tests de-
veloped through the research (Option A), the principle of reciprocity 
was the predominant reason, that is, they saw this benefit as akin to the 
“therapeutic benefits” that are sometimes said to come to participants 
in clinical trials. Other respondents found this option “paltry,” as one 
characterized it.
Sharing a percentage of profits (Option B) was in general a more 
favored choice, based on the principle of fairness and equity, although 
concerns were raised that monetary benefits could result in some form 
of exploitation. One respondent suggested adding developmental goals 
to benefit sharing: “Ideally what you would like to see is something that 
looks like capacity building as well as something that contributes to the 
health of the people.”
Contingent Versus Guaranteed Benefits
Most respondents posited a distinction between sharing in the benefits 
produced by research and receiving a fixed compensation. They explained 
that a flat payment seems like direct remuneration for services, or like 
“purchasing your participants,” which would bring into question whether 
the biological samples were being regarded as a commodity. By contrast, 
the sharing of actual benefits suggests that participants would gain in the 
same way as the investigators if the research succeeds. Although many liked 
contingency, others favored rewards that were more “here and now.”
Still, most of the respondents opposed the option of fixed payments of 
US$800 to individuals, as described in the second part of Scenario C; once 
again, however, respondents’ reasons for this conclusion varied markedly. 
Some said that people should never be paid for participation in this sort of 
research, some explaining that samples should always be freely donated. 
Others believe that people may be paid, but that US$800 was an excessive 
amount, smacking of over-reaching on the part of the investigators. As 
previously noted, some respondents thought the correct distinction was 
between benefits that are contingent and those that are fixed, for others 
the real distinction lay in appropriate benefits being those that are collec-
tive rather than individual; they rejected the US$800 payment because it 
was given to individuals.
The most extreme version of a contingent, collective benefit was Op-
tion D, the Governing Council’s alternative—that the group should own 
all of the intellectual property. Through such ownership, it was assumed 
that the group could reap the rewards of any valuable discoveries based 
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on their genetic material. These respondents typically indicated that they 
saw the form of “benefit sharing” as less important than its goal, that is, 
to go beyond individuals and aim at helping the group as a whole:
It [the precise benefit] is not relevant. What is important is that private 
companies share a percentage or a fixed amount with the society that has 
made the samples available. Whether a percentage or a fixed amount, I 
think it depends on the practical case and on the benefits that people expect. 
However, what is important and indispensable is that private companies 
share the benefits.
Need for a Fair Process
Many respondents also expressed the opinion that fair benefit-sharing 
lies not only in deciding on a specific scheme but also in deciding on its 
procedural aspects, such as how and with whom decisions regarding 
benefit-sharing should be taken:
How do we know that this group is representative of the people who are 
participating in the project? On the other hand, I am also nervous about 
negotiating directly with individual participants because often they got 
cheated, they got exploited by these research teams or these biotech cor-
porations or whatever. . . . How to make it in a way that there is fairness 
and justice and [there] is given [a] proper share of benefits to those who 
are participating in such research projects, I think it is a big ethical issue.  
. . . There is an ethical obligation of whoever is doing this to make sure that 
this is fair to the individual and not saying “you know the money, I don’t 
care at the end who gets it.”
CONCLUSIONS
This article describes the methodology and major findings from a col-
laborative study carried out by ethicists from WHO and the Universities 
of Geneva and Zurich over the past several years (Elger et al. 2008). Here, 
we share some results regarding four topics, relying principally on the 
views of the respondents in our international sample.
Several key lessons can be drawn from our findings and results. First, 
the interviews showed that the respondents’ views on ownership of genetic 
samples and data are highly divergent and somewhat confused. Partly, this 
is due to difficulties with the concept of ownership; partly it is because 
of incompletely analyzed differences in the interests and objectives that 
“ownership” (versus “custodianship”) are meant to serve. Nonetheless, 
kennedy institute oF ethiCs journal • june 2009
[  118  ]
the practical consequences of the divergent and confused views is probably 
minimal since placing biobanks in a custodial rather than an ownership 
role is seen by most respondents not to produce significant practical dif-
ferences, in terms of control exercised by participants once samples have 
been placed into a biobank and dispersed to researchers.
Second, the respondents generally regard MTAs as an effective and 
appropriate vehicle for ensuring responsible management of the samples 
and data entrusted to genetic repositories. Third, although respondents 
generally share a commitment to respecting group interests and abilities, 
this fact alone did not produce any consensus on the means to be used, 
such as group consultation or consent, for ensuring their respect, nor, 
finally, on what should be provided to the community or individuals by 
way of remuneration or shared benefits.
Our study was not intended to provide any normative guidance on 
the ethical or legal rules that should be used to govern genetic databases, 
whether at a national, regional, or international level. However, the find-
ings of our study—which aims to deepen understanding of the ways in 
which the sometimes conflicting standards in international ethical guide-
lines for biobanks actually are understood by informed people around 
the world—generate potential implications for determining how genetic 
databases best may be governed in the future. In particular, we believe 
that our findings and analysis offer helpful insights into the following 
specific, key ethical issues:
(1) Ownership of human biological samples held in biobanks. “Classi-
cal” ownership by the biobank or by sample donors should be replaced by 
an umbrella concept under which the rights and obligations of the biobank, 
donors, researchers, and all other involved stakeholders are negotiated in 
the form of agreements for transfer and use of genetic material and data 
that take into account the differences between individual genetic data, ag-
gregated data, and non-genomic data. The umbrella concept must include 
provisions under which sample donors can exercise a right to withdraw, 
whether this withdrawal implies destruction of samples and data or ir-
reversible anonymization.
(2) Regulation of researchers’ use of samples obtained from biobanks. 
The use of samples obtained from biobanks by third-party investiga-
tors must be regulated by agreements that confine researchers’ activities 
within the scope of consent given by sample sources. Likewise, the range 
of permitted uses should reflect the degree of anonymization of samples 
and data that are made available to researchers. In light of the fact that 
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various arrangements are ethically and legally justified and that facilitating 
international collaboration is important, leading international organiza-
tions and research institutions not only must promulgate guidelines, but 
more importantly also must prepare and make available to the public 
model agreements that can serve as templates for collaborations between 
biobanks and investigators. Our study demonstrates the value that such 
model agreements would offer, since they could be used as a basis for in-
stitutions to improve their regulations and could contribute to the sort of 
international consistency that is unlikely to emerge from guidelines alone, 
given how differently our respondents see the relevant issues.
(3) Collective consent. Collective consent to genetic research can comple-
ment individual informed consent in a meaningful way if the research can 
be expected to have an impact not just on participating individuals but on 
the respective community as a whole—e.g., an ethnic group that might be 
stigmatized as a result of certain genetic features having been identified as 
widespread among this group. In other cases, although it is not a legal or 
ethical requirement, some form of group consultation is advisable when it 
offers a pragmatic advantage for researchers to get support for their study. 
Particular caution is required to make sure that collective consent or group 
consultation schemes do not pre-empt individual informed consent.
(4) Benefit sharing and remuneration of research participants. The 
requirement of benefit sharing has become widely accepted as a general 
idea although the means for its actual implementation has remained highly 
controversial. Although various options have been proposed, international 
collaborations may coexist with benefit sharing and remuneration arrange-
ments that differ based on local circumstances. Benefit sharing and remu-
neration seem to rest on the principles of beneficence and of global justice, 
or some combination of the two. Thus, although few would conclude that 
research sponsors have a duty to provide remuneration or benefit shar-
ing for individual participants who are “average” residents of Western, 
industrial democracies, both remuneration and benefit sharing should be 
considered when researchers use samples contributed to a biobank by 
participants from countries that are much less privileged than that of the 
research sponsor. At any rate, remuneration of individual donors should 
be avoided, as it may function as an undue inducement; instead, benefit-
sharing arrangements should aim to help the groups that bear the burden 
of the research or are otherwise at risk of exploitation in the context of 
biobank research. Such arrangements, too, need to be scrutinized for their 
potential to act as inducements that might compromise leaders’ commit-
ment to protect the interests of individual study participants.
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To summarize, studies such as the one reported here show the need for 
empirical work as a resource to assist national and international policy-
makers. In particular, such findings may be used to inform the framing 
of policies, principles, and practices applicable to biobanks; the drafting 
of guidelines; and the selection of measures that aim to foster greater 
international harmonization of legal rules, ethical norms, and technical 
standards.
NOTES
1. The study was organized by the Department of Ethics, Trade, Human Rights 
and Health Law (ETH) at the World Health Organization (WHO) headquar-
ters in Geneva (Alexander M. Capron with Nikola Biller-Andorno, assisted 
by Agomoni Ganguli) and the Institute of Biomedical Ethics at the Univer-
sity of Geneva (Alexandre Mauron with Bernice Elger and Andrea Boggio), 
with support from the Geneva International Academic Network (GIAN). 
Subsequently, the Institute of Biomedical Ethics at the University of Zurich 
collaborated on completing the study when Nikola Biller-Andorno took up 
the ethics chair there and Agomoni Ganguli became a graduate student. The 
work described here is the joint product of all of these investigators, and a 
fuller account appears in Elger et al. (2008). The study does not aim directly 
to provide normative guidance on the part of WHO, and nothing in this 
report should be taken as representing WHO policy.
2. The Human Development Index (HDI) is the statistical measure used by 
the United Nations Development Program to rank UN member states in its 
annual Human Development Reports. Broadly speaking, the HDI measures 
well-being, taking into account such factors as life expectancy, literacy, edu-
cation, and standard of living.
3. A MTA is a contract that may be used to govern the transfer of research 
materials—samples and data—between biobanks and researchers. MTAs 
set forth the terms for giving researchers access to biological specimens and 
associated information. They typically define the rights and responsibilities 
of both parties with respect to the materials and any derivatives.
4. This part of the scenario continued with a further elaboration, which we do 
not discuss here: “The representative of the colon cancer patients proposes the 
addition of a provision under which investigators agree not to exercise any 
rights they may have to patent a gene sequence.” We then asked respondents 
what they thought of this proposal.
5. Phenotype refers to an organism’s observable outward attributes, or its physi-
cal, biochemical, or physiological appearance.
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APPENDIx: ExCERPT FROM ThE INTERVIEW GuIDE  
(FOR SCENARIO C.2, WHICH APPEARS IN THE TExT AT P. 113)
Do you think Biotech Incorporated must first obtain permission from 
the Governing Council or may it approach individual members of the 
group directly without prior collective permission?
 a. A collective permission is necessary
 b.  Individual consent without prior collective permission is accept-
able
 Why?
If the respondent answers that collective permission is NOT required, go 
to question 4.
If the respondent has answered that prior collective permission is required, 
ask questions 2–3:
Each individual’s characteristics allow him/her to be placed in different 
groups. Do you think prior collective permission would apply to all 
such groups or only to groups with specific characteristics?
I will read you a list of characteristics that could require prior collective 
permission. Among the following, which one or ones do you feel is or 
are relevant, if any?
 a.  The members of a group that has chosen to have a formal structure, 
with leaders.
 b.  Traditionally, the group takes collective decisions on issues that affect 
the whole group.
 c. The group is economically disadvantaged.
 d.  The group is identifiable and the research results may be thought to 
apply to the group generally.
 e. The group is ethnically distinctive.
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